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We present a new protocol for practical quantum cryptography, tailored for an implementation
with weak coherent pulses. The key is obtained by a very simple time-of-arrival measurement on
the data line; an interferometer is built on an additional monitoring line, allowing to monitor the
presence of a spy (who would break coherence by her intervention). Against zero-error attacks (the
analog of photon-number-splitting attacks), this protocol performs as well as standard protocols with
strong reference pulses: the key rate decreases only as the transmission t of the quantum channel.
We present also two attacks that introduce errors on the monitoring line: the intercept-resend, and
a coherent attack on two subsequent pulses. Finally, we sketch several possible variations of this
protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography [1], or quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD), is probably the most mature field in quan-
tum information, both in theoretical and in experimen-
tal advances. On the theoretical side, almost all QKD
protocols have been proven to provide unconditional se-
curity in some regime; on the practical side, QKD has al-
ready reached the stage of commercial prototypes. Still,
much work is needed. A big task consists in bringing
both theory and applications in contact again: practical
QKD systems do not fulfill all the requirements of un-
conditional security proofs (or, if you prefer, these proofs
are still too abstract to cope with a practical system).
Here, we address a different question: we aim for the
most practical QKD system. Instead of looking for a new
implementations of known protocols, we choose to start
from scratch by inventing a new protocol. There are two
basic requirements:
• The protocol must be easily implementable, say
with the smallest number of standard telecom de-
vices. Note that this requirement, as a side ben-
efit, may simplify security studies: we have learnt
in the recent years that any optical component can
be regarded as a ”Trojan horse” because of its im-
perfections [2].
• The security of the system must be guaranteed by
quantum physics, thence in some way quantum co-
herence must play a role.
The goal of this paper is to illustrate this program by
presenting such a system. the key is created in a data
line that is probably the simplest one can think of —
just measure the time of arrival of weak pulses. The
intervention of a spy is checked interferometrically in a
monitoring line. In Section II, we define precisely the
protocol and stress its advantages. In Section III, we
present a quantitative study of security. Finally, Section
IV presents a number of possible variations on the main
idea.
II. THE PROTOCOL
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FIG. 1. Scheme of the protocol. Bob reads the raw key
in detector DB , the monitoring line checks for the breaking
of quantum coherence due to an eavesdropper. See text for
details
A. The source
Alice uses a mode-locked laser, producing pulses of
mean photon-number µ that are separated by a fixed
and well-defined time τ ; with a variable attenuator, she
can blocks some of the pulses (note that a more econom-
ical source would just consist of a cw laser followed by
the variable attenuator). Each logical bit is encoded in a
two-pulse sequence according to the following rules:
|0A〉 =
∣∣√µ ei(2k−1)ϕ〉
2k−1
|0〉2k , (1)
|1A〉 = |0〉2k−1
∣∣√µ ei (2k)ϕ〉
2k
. (2)
For instance, the eight-pulse sequence drawn in Fig. 1
codes for the four-bit string 0100 (read in temporal or-
der, that is, from right to left). For small µ, the states
|0A〉 and |1A〉 have a large overlap because of their vac-
uum component. Since the laser is mode-locked, there
is a phase coherence between any two non-empty pulses.
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Leaving a more general discussion for Section IV, we fo-
cus on the case where bit number k is 1 and bit number
k+1 is 0, like bits number 2 and 3 of 1. Then across the
bit-separation there is a phase coherence:∣∣√µ ei(2k)ϕ〉
2k
∣∣√µ ei(2k+1)ϕ〉
2k+1
. (3)
Note that the choice of the value of ϕ is arbitrary, so from
now on we set ϕ = 0.
B. The ”data line”
The pulses now propagate to Bob, on a quantum
channel characterized by a transmission t = 10−αd/10
(a typical value for α in optical fibers is 0.2 dB/km).
Bob’s setup first splits the pulses using a non-equilibrated
beam-splitter with transmission coefficient tB . The
pulses that are transmitted are used to establish the raw
key (data line). To obtain the bit value, Bob has to dis-
tinguish unambiguously between the two non-orthogonal
states
|0B〉 = |α〉2k−1|0〉2k , (4)
|1B〉 = |0〉2k−1|α〉2k (5)
with α =
√
µ t tB — we have omitted the phase due to
the free propagation, which is the same for all pulses.
As well-known, unambiguous discrimination between two
pure states can succeed with probability pok = 1 −
|〈0B|1B〉|; in the present case, the overlap is |〈0B|1B〉| =
e−|α|
2
, and consequently pok = 1 − e−µ t tB . Now, there
is an obvious way to achieve this result: photon counting
with a perfect detector, because pok is just the probabil-
ity that the detector will detect something. The realistic
situation where the detector has a finite efficiency η can
be modelled by an additional beam-splitter with trans-
mittivity η followed by a perfect detector; in this case, η
appears in the exponent as well. In conclusion, the opti-
mal unambiguous discrimination between |0B〉 and |1B〉
is achieved by the most elementary strategy, simply try
to detect where the photons are. Later, Bob must an-
nounce Alice which items he has detected: this is how
Alice and Bob establish their raw key. Note that no er-
ror is expected on this line, if the switch is perfect and
in the absence of dark counts of the detector: a bit-flip
is impossible because it would correspond to a photon
jumping from a time-bin to another.
Note that the simplicity of Bob’s data line has concrete
practical advantages. There are no lossy and active ele-
ments. Hence, the transmission range can be increased
and no random number generator is needed.
As for the data line, our protocol is similar to the one
of Debuisschert and Boucher [3]. However there, the se-
curity was obtained by the overlap in time between the
pulses coding for different bits. Here, we use rather the
monitoring line described in the next paragraph.
C. The ”monitoring line”
The pulses that are reflected at Bob’s beam-splitter
go to an interferometer that is used for monitoring Eve’s
presence (monitoring line). Here is where quantum co-
herence plays a role. Let αj be the amplitude of pulse j
entering the interferometer: in particular, |αj |2 is either
0 or µ t (1 − tB); and if both αj and αj+1 are non-zero,
then αj+1 = αj . After the interferometer, the pulses that
reach the detectors at time j + 1 is given by
|DM1〉 =
∣∣∣iαj+αj+12
〉
(6)
|DM2〉 =
∣∣∣−αj+αj+12
〉
. (7)
Now, if either αj or αj+1 are zero, then |DM1|2 =
|DM2|2 = 12µ t (1− tB); i.e., conditioned to the fact that
a photon takes the monitoring line, the probabilities of
detecting it in either detector is 12 . However, if both αj
and αj+1 are non-zero, then |DM1|2 = µ t (1 − tB) and
|DM2|2 = 0: only detector DM1 can fire. Consider then
again the case where bit number k is 1 and bit number
k + 1 is 0: as we said above, in this case the two consec-
utive pulses 2k and 2k + 1 are non-empty. This means
that, if coherence is not broken, detector DM2 cannot fire
at time 2k+1. If Eve happens to break the coherence by
reading the channel, it could be detected this way.
Actually, it turns out that, as just described, the pro-
tocol is insecure: Eve can make a coherent measurement
of the number of photons in the two pulses across the
bit-separation. With such an attack, she would not break
the coherence, thus introduce no errors in the monitoring
line, and obtain almost full information (see next Section
for more details). There are several ways of countering
this attack: here, we make use of decoy sequences, in-
spired by the idea of ”decoy states” introduced by Hwang
[4] and by Lo and co-workers [5], but different in its im-
plementation. The principle is the following: with prob-
ability f , Alice leaves both the (2k− 1)-th and the 2k-th
pulses non-empty. A decoy sequence does not encode a
bit value (in contrast to the decoy states of [4,5] that
still encode a state, but in a different way): thence, if the
item is detected in the data line, it will be discarded in
public discussion. However, if a detection takes place in
the monitoring line at time 2k, then it must be in detec-
tor D1M because of coherence. Now Eve can no longer
pass unnoticed: if she attacks coherently across the bit
separation, then she breaks the coherence of the decoy
sequences; if she attacks coherently within each bit, then
she breaks the coherence across the separation; finally, if
she makes a coherent attack on a larger number of pulses,
then she breaks the coherence in fewer positions but gets
much less information.
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Thus, errors are rare: they appear only in the monitor-
ing line, and just for a fraction of the whole cases. Still,
one can estimate the error (thence, the coherence of the
channel) in a reasonable time, if the bit rate is high.
D. Summary of the protocol
Let’s summarize the protocol before moving to a more
quantitative study of security:
1. Alice prepares ”bit 0” with probability 1−f2 , ”bit 1”
with probability 1−f2 and the decoy sequence with
probability f . This is repeated a large number of
times.
2. At the end of the exchange, Alice reveals the items
{kd} corresponding to a decoy sequence. Bob re-
moves all the detections at times 2kd − 1 and 2kd
from his raw key, and he looks whether detector
D2M has ever fired at times 2kd. This way, Alice
and Bob estimate the break of coherence of decoy
pulses.
3. On the remaining fraction of sent bits 1 − f , Bob
reveals the times 2k + 1 in which he had a detec-
tion in D2M . Alice verifies if some of these items
correspond to a bit sequence ”1,0”; thus, Alice and
Bob estimate the break of coherence across the bit-
separation.
4. Finally, Bob reveals the items that he has detected
in the data line. Alice and Bob run error correction
and privacy amplification on these bits and end up
with a secret key.
Should one say in one sentence where the improvement
lies, here it is: one can define a very simple data line and
protect it quantum-mechanically.
At this point, two important remarks can be done.
First, this protocol cannot be analyzed in terms of qubits.
This is obvious, because any bits and coherence are
checked on differently defined pairs. In particular, there
is not a ”natural” single-photon version of the proto-
col (simply replace non-empty coherent state with one-
photon Fock states would be dramatic, since all the se-
quences would become orthogonal). The second remark
is the answer to a possible question. With the idea of
a simple data line for key creation, and a ”complemen-
tary” line for monitoring, one may implement a version
of the BB84 protocol: Alice and Bob agree to produce
the key using only the Z basis; sometimes Alice prepares
one of the eigenstates of the X basis that acts as a de-
coy state. Which are the advantages of our protocol?
We are going to see that our protocol is much more ro-
bust against attacks at zero errors (the analog of photon-
number-splitting attacks).
III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SECURITY
For a reasonable comparison with experiment, we must
introduce the following parameters
• The visibility V of the monitoring interferometer,
whence the probability thatD2M fires in a time cor-
responding to a coherence is 1−V2 instead of zero.
We suppose that Eve can take advantage of these
imperfections: for instance, if the reduced visibility
is due to ϕ 6= 0 in the interferometer, Eve can sys-
tematically correct for this error by displacing the
pulses, and then reproduce V by adding errors in a
way that is profitable for her.
• The imperfections of the three Bob’s detectors, sup-
posed to be identical for simplicity: the quantum
efficiency η and the probability per gate of a dark
count pd. Typical values are η = 10%, pd = 10
−5.
These imperfections are not given to Eve (see Sec-
tion IV on the possibility that Eve forces a detec-
tion, thus effectively setting η = 1 for some pulses).
For simplicity in writing, we make all the quantita-
tive analysis in the limit of small mean photon-number
in Bob’s channel, that is µt << 1.
A. Parameters Alice-Bob on the data line
First, we compute the parameters of Alice-Bob on the
data line. Bob’s detection rate in DB, once decoy se-
quences are removed, is
RB =
[
µT + (1− µT )pd
]
(1− f) (8)
where T = t tB η. In other words, RB times the number
of two-pulse sequences sent by Alice is the length of the
raw key.
If we assume that the switch prepares really empty
pulses when it is closed, the error expected in this line is
only due to the dark counts of the detectors:
Q =
1
2 (1− µT )pd(1− f)
RB
(9)
because dark counts may make the detector fire at both
times with equal probability. The mutual information
Alice-Bob in bits per sent photon is thence
I(A : B) = RB
[
1−H(Q)] . (10)
In what follows, we shall concentrate on attacks by Eve
that do not modify Q. Before moving to that, let’s have
a look at the monitoring line as well.
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B. About the monitoring line
In the presence of dark counts and reduced visibility,
the meaningful detection probabilities in DM1 and DM2,
neglecting double counts are the following [6]:
Time 2k, decoy seq. : Rd1,2 = R
d
M1,2 f (11)
Time 2k + 1, seq. ”1,0” : R101,2 = R
10
M1,2
1− f
4
(12)
where, denoting T˜ = t (1− tB) η, we have defined
R xM1,2 = µT˜
1± Vx
2
+
(
1− µT˜ 1± Vx
2
)
pd . (13)
Contrary to the errors due to dark counts, the departure
from perfect visibility will be entirely attributed to Eve.
This is why we consider a priori different values Vd and
V10 for the visibility in the two cases: as we shall see,
Eve’s attacks may be different.
C. Eve’s attacks
If Bob’s detector has dark counts, I(B : E) is smaller
than I(A : E) for a prepare-and-measure scheme, because
even if Eve knows perfectly what Alice has sent, she can-
not know whether Bob has detected a photon or has had a
dark count. Thus in our case, the Csiszar-Ko¨rner bound
[7] that gives an estimate of the extractable secret key
rate becomes
R ≥ I(A : B) − min {I(A : E), I(B : E)}
= I(A : B) − I(B : E) . (14)
Therefore, we have to compute the mutual information
Bob-Eve.
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FIG. 2. Scheme with Eve.
The kind of attacks by Eve that we consider is sketched
in Fig. 2. We can give Eve all the losses in the line, that
is, we can suppose that Eve removes a fraction 1−t of the
photons, and forwards the remaining fraction t to Bob on
a lossless line. We are going to study:
• An attack in which Eve can gain information with-
out introducing errors. This is related to the losses
on the line; it is the analog of the usual photon-
number-splitting attack [8,9], but is a different at-
tack and less powerful.
• Eve can immediately know if the previous attack
was successful or not; in the case it wasn’t, we con-
sider further the possibility of attacks that intro-
duce errors in the monitoring line (but still no er-
rors in the data line). Specifically, we study a usual
intercept-resend strategy, and a more clever attack
which is performed coherently on two subsequent
pulses across the bit-separation.
1. Eve’s attack without errors
In the case of BB84 and many other protocols, Eve can
exploit multi-photon pulses in a lossy line to perform the
photon-number-splitting attack [8,9]: she counts the pho-
tons in each pulse, and whenever this number is larger
than one, she keeps one photon in a quantum memory
and forwards the remaining photons to Bob on a lossless
line. As such, this attack is not error-free in the present
protocol: counting the photons in each pulse breaks the
coherence between successive pulses, thus introducing er-
rors in the monitoring line — actually, because of the
peculiar encoding of the bits, this attack reduces here to
the intercept-resend, see below.
More subtle is the analysis of a practical version of
the attack using cascaded beam-splitters [10]: Eve uses a
highly unbalanced BS, with transmission 1−ε and reflec-
tion ε; if she has a detection, she forwards the remaining
photons to Bob; otherwise, she begins anew, and so on
until the losses that she introduces reach the transmission
t of the quantum channel. The advantage of this strategy
is that, in the presence of two or more photons, it is very
rare that more than one photon is coupled into Eve’s de-
tector. Indeed, this beam-splitting attack approximates
a photon-counting. In our case, this strategy will intro-
duce errors in the monitoring line as well: it does not
modify the relative phase, but the relative intensity be-
tween subsequent pulses, thus leading to an unbalancing
of the interferometer. The full analysis of such a strategy
will be studied in a further work.
In summary, both the ideal photon-number-splitting
and its approximate implementation through cascaded
beam-splitters do not rank among the zero-error attacks
against our protocol. In fact, Eve can only perform the
basic beam-splitting attack: she removes a fraction 1 − t
of the photons, and transmits the remaining fraction t
to Bob on a lossless line. With the fraction that she has
kept, the best thing Eve can do is just to measure them
(recall the argument about optimal unambiguous state
discrimination). This way, she detects µ(1 − t) photons
per pulse. When Eve has a detection in DE , she knows
the bit that Alice has sent. Then she lets the remain-
ing part of the pulse travel to Bob on the lossless line
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(the grey box of Fig. 2 is simply a line). Bob detects
something exactly as if Eve had not been there. So
I(B : E|DE) = I(A : B) . (15)
In summary, Eve knows a fraction µ(1− t) of the key just
because of the losses in the quantum channel: this frac-
tion must always be subtracted in privacy amplification.
It is instructive to compute the optimal value of µ un-
der the assumption that Eve introduces no errors, and
neglecting dark counts (Q = 0). In BB84, this value is
µBB84 = t, giving RBB84 =
1
4η t
2 [11]. Here, Alice and
Bob must maximize R given in (14); using (10) and (15),
this reads
R = µ t tB η (1− f)
(
1− µ(1− t)) . (16)
The optimization dR/dµ = 0 is readily done and yields
µopt =
1
2(1− t) (17)
whence
Ropt =
1
4(1− t) t tB η (1− f) . (18)
This is an important improvement over BB84: µopt is
large and is basically constant with decreasing t (long
quantum channels); as a consequence, the secret-key rate
decreases only linearly (and not quadratically) with t.
This is the same improvement that can be obtained by
using decoy states [5] or a strong reference pulse [12];
note however that the hardware is much simpler here.
When Eve’s detector DE does not fire, which happens
with probability 1 − µ(1 − t), Eve must perform some
attack on the pulses flying to Bob if she wants to gain
some information. These attacks will certainly introduce
errors, either in the data line or in the monitoring line. In
the following, we present two such attacks (Fig. 3): a ba-
sic intercept-resend (I-R), and a photon-number-counting
attack performed coherently on two subsequent pulses
across the bit-separation (2c-PNC).
Alice
Eve I-R
Eve
2c-PNC
FIG. 3. Comparison of two attacks that introduce er-
rors. In the I-R attack, Eve prepares a sequence of localized
Fock states, thus breaking the coherence everywhere. In the
2c-PNC attack, Eve prepares a sequence of Fock states that
are delocalized across the separation of bits: only the coher-
ence of decoy sequences is broken. Note that arrows denote
only coherence between subsequent pulses, the one checked
by the interferometer; however, on the original sequence, all
the non-empty pulses are coherent with one another, while in
the sequences after Eve’s attack only the indicated coherence
remains.
2. Eve’s attack with errors (I): intercept-resend
Let’s begin with the intercept-resend (I-R) strategy.
Eve simply detects the pulse flying to Bob: her detector
will fire with probability µt, and in this case she prepares
a single-photon in the good time-bin and forwards it to
Bob. Obviously, both RB and Q are unchanged under
this strategy.
Note that RB will be the sum of three terms: Eve has
detected and Bob detects too; Eve has detected and Bob
has a dark count; Eve has not detected and Bob has a
dark count. Now, Eve can distinguish the last one from
the two first, and she knows that in the last case she has
no information on Alice’s and Bob’s bits. So
I(B : E|IR) = [RB − (1− µt)pd(1− f)]
[
1−H(Q′)] (19)
where
Q′ =
1
2 (1− tBη)pd
tBη + (1− tBη)pd (20)
is the fraction of Bob’s detection on which she has the
wrong result.
Of course, the I-R attack breaks all the coherences (see
Fig. 3), and will therefore introduce errors in the moni-
toring line. Specifically, whenever Eve has performed the
I-R attack,
Vd|IR = V10|IR = 0 . (21)
3. Eve’s attack with errors (II): 2-coherent PNC
In the absence of decoy sequences, Eve may obtain in-
formation without introducing errors in the monitoring
line, by counting the number of photons coherently be-
tween two pulses, not within each bit but across the sep-
aration line (see Fig. 3). This attack does not break the
phase between these pulses. Of course, if Eve finds n > 0
photons, on the spot she does not know to which bit the
photon belongs; but she will learn it later, by listening
to Bob’s list of accepted bits [13]. Actually, in some very
rare case Eve still does not get any information: if Eve
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prepares n > 0 photons in two successive two-pulse se-
quences, and Bob accepts a detection in the bit common
to both sequences, Eve has no idea of his result. How-
ever, since such cases are rare, we make the conservative
assumption that Eve always gets full information. Thus
I(B : E|2cPNC) = I(B : E|IR) . (22)
Eve has introduced errors in the monitoring line only in
the items corresponding to decoy sequences:
Vd|2c = 0 , V10|2c = 1 . (23)
4. Collecting everything
We can now collect all that we know form this analy-
sis of security. The parameters describing Alice and Bob
are those listed in paragraph IIIA above. Let pIR and
p2c be the probabilities that Eve performs the I-R at-
tack, resp. the 2c-PNC attack. Recall that she performs
these attacks only when her detector DE did not fire, so
pIR + p2c ≤ 1− µ(1− t). Then:
I(B : E) = µ(1− t)RB
[
1−H(Q)] +
+ (pIR + p2c)R
′
B
[
1−H(Q′)] (24)
with the notation R′B = RB − (1−µt)pd(1− f) and with
Q′ given in (20). This is the expression that must be in-
serted into (14) to obtain the extractable secret key rate
(in other terms, this is the quantity to be corrected by
privacy amplification).
On the monitoring line, Alice and Bob measure (11)
and (12), whence they extract Vd and V10 that inform
them about Eve’s attacks according to
Vd = 1− pIR − p2c , (25)
V10 = 1− pIR . (26)
Note in particular that, if Alice and Bob find Vd = V10,
they can conclude that Eve has not used the 2c-PNC at-
tack — by the way, this is why we presented the analysis
of the I-R strategy, obviously worse than 2c-PNC from
Eve’s standpoint: in a practical experiment, Vd = V10 is
very likely to hold (after all, Eve is not there...). There-
fore, formulae for the I-R attack will be useful in the
analysis of experimental data.
IV. VARIATIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
A. Variations
Here are a few ideas of variations in the protocol, that
may have some additional benefit and require further
study:
• Alice may change during the protocol the defini-
tion of the pulses that define a bit. If there is
a convenient fraction of decoy sequences, Eve has
no way of distinguishing a priori which pairs of
successive pulses encode a bit. This way, the ef-
fect of the 2c-PNC attack becomes equally dis-
tributed among decoy and ”1,0” sequences, i.e.
Vd = V10 = 1 − pIR − 12p2c. Moreover, whenever
Eve attacks the bit instead of attacking across the
bit-separation, she cannot gain any information.
• In fact, nothing forces to define bits by subsequent
pulses: Alice and Bob can decide later, adding a
sort of ”sifting” phase to the protocol. This means
that Alice can now send whatever pulse sequence,
she is no longer restricted to those that define a
bit or a decoy sequence. It is not clear whether
this modification helps, if the hardware is kept un-
changed: Alice and Bob still check only the coher-
ence between subsequent pulses; moreover, sifting
means additional losses and additional information
revealed publicly.
• Instead of introducing decoy sequences as we did
above, one may study the effect of decoy pulses with
different intensities, as proposed by Hwang and by
Lo and co-workers to protect the BB84 protocol
against the photon-number-splitting attack [4,5].
B. Possible loopholes
The difficulty in assessing the security of practical
QKD, is the huge number of imperfections that may hide
loopholes for security. These imperfections exist in all im-
plementations and for all protocols, but their effect and
the corresponding protection may vary. Here we present
some of these.
• About Trojan-horse and similar realistic attacks [2]:
Alice’s setup must be protected against Trojan-
horse attacks, with the suitable filters, isolators
etc. In Bob’s setup nothing is variable; however,
one must prevent the possible light emission from
avalanche photodiodes to become available to Eve:
if the firing of a detector can be seen from outside
Bob, the protocol becomes immediately insecure.
• After a detection, Bob’s detectors are blind during
some time. In particular, if Eve happens to know
when Bob’s detector DM2 has fired, she can attack
strongly the subsequent pulses because no error will
be detected then, and gain one bit (just one, be-
cause when DB has fired, then it has a dead time
as well). For the security of the protocol, Eve must
have no way of assessing the firing of a detector,
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and Bob must announce publicly this information
only after the detector is ready again. This may im-
ply some suitable synchronization in the software,
or more simply, to shut DB as long as DM2 has not
recovered. The nuisance depends of course on the
ratio between the raw bit rate and the dead time.
• In all this paper, we have considered only the case
where Eve does not change Bob’s detection rates
in the data line and in the monitoring line. By
sending out stronger pulses, Eve might force the
detection of those items on which she has full in-
formation; but in turn, she would increase the rate
of double counts among Bob’s detectors. This ef-
fect must be quantified, and the number of double,
or even triple, counts must be monitored during the
experiment.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have presented a new protocol for
quantum cryptography whose realization is much sim-
pler than that of previously described ones. Specifically,
Bob’s station is such that losses are minimized and no
dynamical component is needed.
We thank H.-K. Lo for stimulating comments. We ac-
knowledge financial support from idQuantique and from
the Swiss NCCR ”Quantum photonics”.
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